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I. INTRODUCTION 
Regulation Crowdfunding (“Reg CF”) has already celebrated its 
first anniversary.1 After a frustratingly long delay during Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) rulemaking for the JOBS Act’s 
most modern securities fundraising technique,2 issuers may now tap 
the Internet’s vast populace to raise money. By many measures, the 
law is working—existing small businesses and new startups alike are 
getting the jumpstart they need.3 As an added benefit, the 
companies funded by investment crowdfunding also seem to be 
creating the kinds of jobs (if perhaps not yet in the desired numbers) 
originally envisioned by lawmakers.4 It seems that, barring some shift 
in the legislative agenda of Congress, federal investment 
crowdfunding is here to stay.5 
1. See Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9974, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-76324, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 274) [hereinafter Regulation 
Crowdfunding] (“The final rules and forms are effective May 16, 2016 . . . .”). Portal 
registration has been open since January 29, 2016. Id. 
2. See Samuel Guzik, JOBS Act Crowdfunding Begins on May 16, 2016: Don’t Get
Busted for Solicitation!, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 28, 2016, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/03/83470-jobs-act-crowdfunding-begins 
-on-may-16-2016-dont-get-busted-for-solicitation/ (“Though Congress dictated that 
this task be completed by the end of 2012, the SEC missed the mark by nearly three 
years.”); see also Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306, 320 (2012) [hereinafter JOBS Act] (requiring rulemaking by the SEC “not later 
than 270 days after the date of enactment”). 
3. See Larry Alton, Does Crowdfunding for Startups Actually Work?, PURCH,
https://www.business.com/articles/does-crowdfunding-for-startups-actually-work/ 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
4. See Sherwood Neiss, Here’s How Regulation Crowdfunding Performed in 2016,
VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 11, 2017, 5:05 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2017/01/11 
/heres-how-regulation-crowdfunding-performed-in-2016/ (reporting a job creation 
rate of 2.2 jobs per funded company, often in “underserved communities”). 
5. See id. (advocating for the incoming administration to promote
crowdfunding, especially as an economic booster since many investors fund local 
projects). It seems unlikely that the current Republican-controlled Congress will 
drastically alter the JOBS Act, a measure that originally passed with overwhelming 
Republican support. See Pete Kasperowicz, House Approves JOBS Act in 390-23 Vote, 
THE HILL (Mar. 8, 2012, 6:02 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action 
/house/214979-house-passes-jobs-act-sends-to-senate. In fact, the Crowdfunding 
Enhancement Act is already under consideration in an attempt to further enable 
online capital raising via crowdfunding. See Crowdfunding Enhancement Act, S. 
1031, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate 
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At the same time, many states have also waded into the fray with 
their own crowdfunding solutions.6 In fact, several states had 
operational investment crowdfunding systems months and even 
years before the federal government.7 Many of the same benefits—
job creation, driving community entrepreneurship, survival of small 
businesses—seem to be trickling down in the intrastate models as 
well.8 The probability exists, especially as the federal model builds 
steam and gains even broader support across state legislatures, that 
state-level investment crowdfunding will also be around for the long 
haul.9 
While there have been comparatively few Reg CF offerings to 
date (with relatively small offering amount aggregates, at least as 
-bill/1031; see also infra Part V. 
6. See, e.g., MNvest Registration Exemption, MINN. STAT. § 80A.461 (2016).
For a list of intrastate crowdfunding statutes current through November 16, 2016, 
see N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, NASAA INTRASTATE CROWDFUNDING UPDATE (2016)
[hereinafter NASAA INTRASTATE OVERVIEW], http://nasaa.cdn.s3.amazonaws 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/NASAA-Intrastate-Crowdfunding-Update      
-111616.pdf. 
7. NASAA INTRASTATE OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 3.
8. See id. at 5 (listing a variety of businesses and industries that use intrastate
crowdfunding). 
9. As contrasted with federal Reg CF, legislative changes will be almost
necessary in order for intrastate crowdfunding statutes to maintain their efficacy. 
Most intrastate crowdfunding models are tied to the federal intrastate offering 
exemption under 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(11) (2016). See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, 
INTRASTATE CROWDFUNDING LEGISLATION (2016), http://nasaa.cdn.s3.amazonaws 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/NASAA-Crowdfunding-Index-11-16-2016.pdf. 
The SEC recently made changes to the Rule 147 safe harbor for intrastate offering 
advertising and solicitation and introduced a completely new exemption dubbed 
Rule 147A. See Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-10238, Exchange Act Release No. 34-79161, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 83,494 (Nov. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Final Rules 147/147A]. State laws based 
on compliance with section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 147 will 
need to be amended in order to take full advantage of the revisions. For a deeper 
analysis of the problem created by mandatory compliance with section 3(a)(11) and 
old Rule 147, see Timothy M. Joyce, 1000 Days Late and $1 Million Short: The Rise and 
Rise of Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 343 (2017). 
3
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compared to other options like Regulation A+10 and Regulation D11), 
there have been enough offerings to amass sufficient data12 from 
which to draw some meaningful conclusions about the likely causes 
of the success or failure of an offering. And some practitioners have 
already begun to crunch the numbers.13 To the extent that it is 
possible to glean some useful guidance from previous offerings, this 
article attempts to synthesize the data with the authors’ personal and 
practical experiences14 to propose some investment crowdfunding 
10. See J.D. Alois, NextGen Reports on Reg A+ Market: Reviews Early Data on 131
Filings, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2016, 4:18 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider 
.com/2016/10/91066-nextgen-reports-reg-market-reviews-early-data-131-filings/ 
(summarizing a NextGen report on Regulation A+ offerings under Title II of the 
JOBS Act). “[F]or a full year between June 19, 2015 and June 22, 2016,” Tier I and 
Tier II companies solicited a combined total of more than $2 billion. Id. Based on 
just the raw numbers of offerings, Regulation A+ seems to have somewhat similar 
popularity as Reg CF. Compare id. (reporting either 131 or 144 Regulation A+ 
offerings, depending on which analysis is trusted), with Samuel Effron, Regulation 
Crowdfunding: A Six-Month Update, JD SUPRA (Dec. 28, 2016), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/regulation-crowdfunding-a-six-month-15854/ 
(reporting 160 Form C filings in 2016). 
11. See Effron, supra note 10 (“[T]he total amount raised in Reg CF offerings
in this six-month period compares very unfavorably to the amount raised in 
Regulation D offerings during the same period, which is close to $30 billion.”). 
12. Form C data is publicly available via search of the EDGAR system. See
EDGAR Search Tools, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
Wefunder, one of the first registered portals under Reg CF, also keeps up-to-date 
tallies of Reg CF offerings. See The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, 
WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/stats (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (reporting 122 
offerings to date, 82 of which have been successfully funded, for a total in excess of 
$20 million). 
13. E.g., CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS,
http://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/cca-regulation-crowdfunding-indices/ (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2017); The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 12; 
Marc A. Leaf et al., Leading the Crowd: An Analysis of the First 50 Crowdfunding Offerings, 
DRINKER BIDDLE: INSIGHTS & EVENTS (July 14, 2016), 
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/insights/publications/2016/07/leading-the      
-crowd-first-50-crowdfunding-offerings. The Crowdfund Capital Advisors numbers 
inform a substantial part of the analysis in Part III, infra. 
14. Author Zach Robins participated in the drafting of the MNvest statute in
Minnesota. He practices in the area of securities law and represents clients on both 
the issuer and portal operator sides of an offering. Author Tim Joyce assisted Zach 
on one of the first crowdfunding offerings under MNvest during a 2016 summer 
associateship at Winthrop & Weinstine, PA in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
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best practices.15 In addition, this article suggests some best practices 
for potential crowdfunders in areas of offerings not easily reduced 
to numerical data points.16 In the end, the authors hope to provide 
actionable advice to the potential crowdfund issuer and its counsel 
for crafting the most appropriate offering structure for a given 
capital raise.17 
The article proceeds in four18 parts: Part II provides a brief 
description of investment crowdfunding, as a necessary history for 
an uninitiated reader.19 Next, Part III examines the publicly available 
data on federal crowdfunding offerings to date.20 Then, Part IV uses 
the data to recommend best practices for investment crowdfunding 
offerings using Reg CF, including some best practices that do not 
submit easily to numerical data points.21 Part V offers some next steps 
in the evolution of federal- and state-level crowdfunding and a brief 
conclusion to the article.22 
II. REGULATION CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS AT A GLANCE
Any evaluation of the ideal crowdfunding offering will require 
an understanding of crowdfunding’s unique place in the panoply of 
securities fundraising techniques. Investment crowdfunding first 
emerged as one part of a comprehensive solution to free up stalled 
U.S. capital markets, particularly for small businesses.23 After the 
catastrophic market crash in the latter part of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, traditional sources of capital had dried up.24 For 
the most part, the end result and purpose—the “what” and “why” of 
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. Note that the Postscript, infra Part VI, is intended as an addendum speaking
to the topic of the 2017 Mitchell Hamline Law Review Symposium. The scope of the 
Postscript is both broader and different than the rest of the article. 
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See WILLIAM MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, THE JOBS ACT: CROWDFUNDING FOR
SMALL BUSINESSES AND STARTUPS 21 (2012) (“When banks are told to reduce risk, 
small businesses, especially startups, are the first to see credit levels reduced.”). 
24. See, e.g., id. at 23 (“Over the last ten years, the number of companies raising
capital through the issuance of stock in the public securities markets has declined 
dramatically.”). 
5
Robins and Joyce: How to Crowdfund and Not Fall Flat on Your Face: Best Practices f
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
1064 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:5 
a crowdfunding offering—are much the same as any securities 
offering.25 An issuer receives money from investors for the purpose 
of starting, maintaining, or expanding its operations. It is in the 
details about market players and offering implementation—the 
“who,” “how,” and “how much” of these offerings—that investment 
crowdfunding offers truly unique fundraising solutions. The next 
sections will highlight and comment upon the most important 
differences between crowdfunding and other federal26 securities 
exemptions. 
A. The “Who”: Investors and Issuers 
Where other parts of the JOBS Act focused on increasing the 
amount of capital available to an issuer each year27 or freeing up 
publicity restrictions,28 the main innovation embodied in Title III of 
the Act involved reaching a previously underrepresented type of 
investor on a large scale: the non-accredited investor.29 Prior to that 
25. The academic literature is rife with analysis of how investment
crowdfunding fits (or does not fit) into the federal securities regulation schema. For 
a recent exploration of how Securities Act section 4(a)(6) and Reg CF stack up 
against other securities fundraising techniques, particularly Minnesota’s intrastate 
alternative, see generally Joyce, supra note 9. This article will not attempt to replicate 
those efforts and thus assumes at least a passing familiarity with federal securities 
law. However, for the truly uninitiated, roughly: In the United States, the offer and 
sale of shares of profits based on the efforts of others is governed by securities laws, 
both at the state and federal levels. Issuers offering such shares must either register 
the shares or find an exemption. Section 4(a)(6) in Title III of the JOBS Act created 
an exemption for the sale of securities based on a crowdfunding model, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77d(a)(6) (2012), and it is with this exemption that this paper is principally
concerned. 
26. The most accessible crowdfunding offering data comes from federal Form
C filings with the SEC. Although many states have operational intrastate 
crowdfunding statutes, information based on those offerings is either nonpublic or 
simply not large enough to warrant the drawing of many conclusions. See NASAA 
INTRASTATE OVERVIEW, supra note 6. Further, each state’s enactment of intrastate 
crowdfunding differs slightly from the others; thus, a comparison would be of apples 
and oranges.  
27. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 401–02 (2012) (Regulation
A+ offering exemption for annual limit increases). 
28. Id. § 105.
29. It is estimated that only a miniscule portion of the U.S. population qualifies
as “accredited investors” for securities law purposes. See Devin Thorpe, SEC Mulls 
Changes to Accredited Investor Standards, 18 Crowdfunders React, FORBES (July 15, 2014, 
12:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2014/07/15/sec-mulls 
6
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point, the substantial30 pool of potential investors who did not meet 
the income or net worth thresholds for “accreditation” were 
effectively barred from participation in the most common form of 
fundraising: the private placement.31 Non-accredited investors were 
able to participate in certain types of offerings like Regulation A and 
fully registered offerings, but these very expensive types of offerings 
were the first to dry up during the market crash.32 In short, there was 
a problem with finding legal and affordable means to match the 
large supply of non-accredited investors with the large demand for 
capital by smaller issuers. 
Crowdfunding also provided an option that was much needed 
by smaller issuers for several reasons. First, these issuers traditionally 
were not able to afford the costs of raising funds. For existing small 
businesses, even the costs of a private placement or SCOR (Small 
Corporate Offering Registration) offering can be substantial.33 
Next, even if these companies could afford the costs, the success 
of such an offering was necessarily tied to the size of the company’s 
network of “three Fs”—friends, family, and fools—available to the 
issuer.34 Without enough people in the potential investor pool, a 
-changes-to-accredited-investor-standards-18-crowdfunders-react/#5497b7fe12f2 
(reporting estimations of the number of accredited investors in the country). 
30. See id.
31. See John S. Lore, The Most Common Exemption—Regulation D Rule 506, CAP.
FUND L. GROUP, http://www.capitalfundlaw.com/2015/04/05/the-most-common 
-exemptionregulation-d-rule-506/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (“Rule 506 is the most 
commonly relied upon exemption in private offerings (accounting for more than 
90% of offerings, according to SEC statistics).”). 
32. Cf. SCOTT BAUGESS ET AL., CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–2014 1 (2015), https:// 
www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/unregistered-offering10-2015.pdf 
(“Capital formation through private placement of securities has increased 
substantially since the onset of the financial crisis. Amounts raised through 
unregistered securities offerings have outpaced the level of capital formation 
through registered securities offerings during recent years, and totaled more than 
$2 trillion during 2014.”). 
33. See, e.g., Mike Goodrich, Raising Money: What Is a Private Placement
Memorandum (PPM) and When Do You Need One?, WELD: BIRMINGHAM’S NEWSPAPER 
(June 19, 2012), http://weldbham.com/blog/2012/06/19/raising-money-what-is-a 
-private-placement-memorandum-ppm-and-when-do-you-need-one/ (estimating 
that a quality private placement memorandum can be prepared for around 
$20,000). 
34. See David T. Schneider, Can Equity Crowdfunding Crowd-Out Other
Alternative Sources of Finance? 15–18 (Sept. 12, 2016) (unpublished M.S. thesis, 
7
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cash-strapped issuer will not be able to justify the costs of fundraising 
compliance. Even if an issuer has a built-in network of enthusiastic 
supporters,35 these individuals often do not have enough money to 
make substantial investments in companies, at least not the kind that 
can truly jumpstart a business. 
Finally, these smaller issuers often do not have the history of 
operations, if any history, necessary to attract attention from the 
types of institutions that offer capital in smaller amounts. Angel 
investors and venture capitalists also often demand an active role in 
the management of a company in which they invest. Conversely, 
owners of closely-held issuers, whose livelihoods can depend on the 
flexibility of company operations, may be hesitant to select any 
fundraising option that cedes significant control to an unknown 
outsider. 
Although seemingly negative, the same factors listed above also 
provide small issuers some key benefits that they may not otherwise 
access. The JOBS Act offers (1) an affordable fundraising option that 
(2) reaches enough potential investors, (3) with enough available 
capital, (4) all without requiring a significant shift in management 
control.36 
B. The “How”: Use of the Internet and Portals 
An important corollary to the innovative expansion of offerings 
to non-accredited investors was the use of the Internet in general, 
and social media in particular, as a medium to reach the crowd.37 In 
fact, the models on which investment crowdfunding was patterned—
HEC Paris), http://www.vernimmen.net/ftp/160912_Thesis_David_Schneide 
r_vF.pdf (providing a helpful chart breaking down types of investors and the 
amounts and types of projects they support). 
35. See Stacy Cowley, Tired of Waiting for U.S. to Act, States Pass Crowdfunding Laws
and Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1GZIym1. 
36. See generally Mlopes, Why Is Crowd Funding a Good Idea?, CROWDFUNDING AM.
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://crowdfundingamerica.blogspot.com/2011/12/why-is-crowd 
-funding-good-idea.html (discussing benefits of crowdfunding in general). 
37. See Peter J. Loughran et al., The SEC Hands out a Halloween Treat to
Crowdfunding Supporters, A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY (Dec. 2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2015/12/06_loughran.html 
(“Title III and Regulation Crowdfunding seek to model popular websites like 
Kickstarter and IndieGoGo, for securities offerings . . . .”). 
8
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exemplified by the practices of Kickstarter38 and Indiegogo39—
almost certainly owe their success to the fact that projects can reach 
a vast network via social media platforms.40 Campaign founders on 
these crowdfunding platforms prove the worth of their projects via 
short videos.41 The projects are then judged by the “wisdom of the 
crowd”42 at large, instead of being limited to backers in the person’s43 
direct personal network. Historically, however, communication with 
such a large number of non-accredited strangers (for example, via a 
publicly available Facebook post or Tweet) would have run afoul of 
securities law.44 
The fact that “[o]nline capital raising is . . . at its core a ‘general 
solicitation’” exists in tension with the general ban on advertising 
and solicitation of unregistered offerings in the rest of securities 
38. See About Us, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/about (last visited
Mar. 31, 2017). 
39. See How It Works, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/how-it-works
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
40. See Dara Fontein, The Secret to the Best Kickstarter Campaigns Is Social Media,
HOOTSUITE (Sept. 2, 2015), https://blog.hootsuite.com/the-best-kickstarter 
-campaigns-secret-weapon-is-social-media/ (“Community is the backbone of any 
Kickstarter project, so how you use social media can make or break a campaign.”). 
41. See, e.g., Jessica Taige, Jessie’s Nutty Cups: Help Spread the Nutty-ness!,
INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/jessie-s-nutty-cups-help-spread 
-the-nutty-ness#/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
42. See Jamie Hopkins & Katie Hopkins, Not All That Glitters Is Gold—Limitations
of Equity Crowdfunding Regulations, 16 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2013) (quoting U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STATEMENT REGARDING THE PROPOSING RELEASE ON
CROWDFUNDING (Oct. 23, 2013) (statement of Comm’r Kara M. Stein)). 
43. Typically, it is individuals seeking funding that use these models, rather
than companies. See, e.g., Zack “Danger” Brown, Potato Salad, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/zackdangerbrown/potato-salad 
/description (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). But see, e.g., Oculus Rift: Step into the Game, 
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1523379957/oculus-rift-step 
-into-the-game (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (demonstrating a notable exception to 
the generalization that individuals rather than companies use these models). 
Sometimes, it is a mix of the two—individuals trying to start their small businesses. 
See, e.g., Taige, supra note 41. 
44. There simply was not an exemption from registration which permitted
advertising to non-accredited strangers. This is problematic because “Title III 
investments [are] the riskiest class—and [are] being peddled to the most 
unsophisticated and vulnerable class of investors.” Samuel Guzik, SEC Quietly Injects 
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law.45 Under Title III of the JOBS Act, however, Congress solved this 
problem by conscripting the web-based platforms hosting these 
offerings to act as “portals” in much the same way as underwriters 
and broker-dealers.46 These portals act as the front-line of investor 
protection, serving multiple functions: gatekeepers to the official 
offering documents,47 market signals of regulatory compliance for 
the offering,48 and policing agents to verify individual investor 
qualifications and limits.49 Once the issuer files its Form C with the 
SEC, it is still severely—though not entirely—restricted in the 
45. Georgia Quinn, Advertising, Social Media and the New World of Crowdfunding,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com 
/2014/01/30968-advertising-social-media-new-world-crowdfunding/ (raising a 
potential securities law pitfall in the fact that crowdfunding online “intuitively lends 
itself to the use of the multitude of social media outlets”). The ban on general 
solicitation (absent registration) of a securities offering is longstanding and subject 
to only a limited number of exceptions. See id. 
46. In fact, a registered broker-dealer can serve as the portal. See Regulation
Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Crowdfunding Intermediaries, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg 
/tmcompliance/cfintermediaryguide.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (identifying 
who can act as a crowdfunding intermediary and requirements for both 
intermediaries and funding portals). 
47. When issuers are ready to communicate with the crowd, section 4A(b)(2)
of the Securities Act prohibits advertising the terms of a crowdfunding offering, 
“except for notices which direct investors to the funding portal or broker.” 
Regulation Crowdfunding Rules, SEEDINVEST, https://www.seedinvest.com/blog 
/crowdfunding/regulation-crowdfunding-rules (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). Any 
information relating to the offering that is posted on the intermediary’s website 
must be filed with the SEC. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 227.204 (2016). 
48. Crowdfunding intermediaries are responsible for having a “reasonable
basis” to believe that an issuer is not conducting a fraudulent offering. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 227.301. There are some commentators, however, who argue that funding portals
should be allowed a much more active role in “curating” (i.e., vetting) 
crowdfunding offerings. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, 95 
N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1496 (2017) (noting that even if portals themselves are not legally 
able to offer subjective investment advice, expert investors could provide the kind 
of “merits” review that would be useful to novice investors). Industry players agree 
with the sentiment. See Equity Crowdfunding Rules: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 
SEEDINVEST, https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/jobs-act/equity-crowdfunding-rules 
-good-bad-ugly-part-ii (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (“Why not allow a portal such as 
SeedInvest, which employs former professional investors, to filter out the noise for 
the benefit of its investor base? Why not allow an additional layer of fraud protection 
on behalf of investors?”). 
49. Limitations on individual investors’ commitments to an issuer are a new
concept to securities law. See infra Section II.C. 
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 5
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss5/5
2017] HOW TO CROWDFUND 1069 
content of its outside-the-portal advertising.50 Social media 
distribution can serve the function of driving potential crowd-
investors to the portal via hyperlinks, though admittedly not much 
else under the current regulations.51 Even considering the severe 
restrictions, the use of the Internet in general—and social media in 
particular—under Reg CF remains groundbreaking for small 
securities offerings involving non-accredited investors in the United 
States. 
C. The “How Much”: Per-Offering Limits, Per-Investor Limits, and 
Integration 
Reg CF has a $1 million yearly limit for issuers.52 This relatively 
low total, at least as compared to the JOBS Act’s increase for 
Regulation A+,53 is in line with the goal that this style of offering help 
smaller businesses and startups.54 And, as far as securities law in 
general goes, a smaller limit is not unusual when non-accredited 
investors are involved.55 
50. See Advertising Your Regulation CF Offering: What Issuers Need to Know,
SEEDINVEST, https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/advertising-your-regulation-cf 
-offering-what-issuers-need-to-know (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (“After you launch 
your offering by filing your Form C with the SEC, there are only two types of 
communication permitted outside the platform: [c]ommunications that don’t 
mention the ‘terms of the offering’; and [c]ommunications that just contain 
‘tombstone’ information.”). 
51. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 227.204 (noting the limited information in a
crowdfunding issuer’s “tombstone” ad). 
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1).
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (limiting Regulation A+ offerings to $20 million
(Tier I) or $50 million (Tier II), depending on factors like the type of financial 
audits involved). 
54. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Final Rules to
Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-226.html. 
55. See id. Until recently, Rule 504 of Regulation D, which allows unlimited
numbers of non-accredited investors, had an identical annual limit; the new limit is 
$5 million. Id. The increased dollar limits of revised Rule 504 may increase its 
desirability relative to current Reg CF. However, the Rule 504 advertising 
restrictions (when targeting non-accredited investors, at least) will remain a 
comparative detriment to Reg CF’s (restricted) embrace of Internet advertising. 
Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (incorporating § 230.502’s advertising restrictions), with 
id. § 227.204 (restricting issuers from advertising terms of an offer). 
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What is new to the realm of securities fundraising options is the 
limitation on yearly investments by a given investor.56 Under Reg CF, 
not only are issuers limited in yearly fundraising, but individual 
investors are also capped, depending on certain income and net 
worth factors.57 If either the annual income or net worth of an 
investor is below $100,000, the limit is calculated one way.58 If both 
the annual income and net worth of an investor are $100,000 or 
above, the calculation is different.59 And in no case is any investor, 
accredited or not, allowed to invest more than $100,000 in Reg CF 
offerings in one year.60 The upshot here is that any Reg CF offering 
of $1 million will require at least ten extremely wealthy, and 
extremely convinced, backers to hit the yearly cap. More likely of 
course, and as explored in the actual data in more detail infra, is the 
situation where several hundred backers are required for a successful 
offering. 
A positive feature of Reg CF offerings is that they are not subject 
to integration with other securities offerings.61 This should mean 
that issuers are free to experiment with crowdfunding offerings 
without fear of losing the protection of other exemptions. In theory, 
56. See Christopher Mirabile, 2016 Crowdfunding Rules: How the Restrictions Work
and Why It Matters, INC. (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.inc.com/christopher-mirabile 
/2016-crowdfunding-rules-how-the-restrictions-work-and-why-it-matters.html. 
57. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 227.100; Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity
Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 13, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm 
(providing a handy chart illustrating how to determine one’s investment limit). 
Although somewhat similar to the income and net worth standards which qualify an 
investor as “accredited” (and thus unlimited in yearly investing), the Reg CF investor 
limit calculations have numerically different thresholds. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100; 
Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, supra. 
58. See § 227.100(a)(2)(i) (limiting the amount to “[t]he greater of $2,000 or
5 percent of the lesser of the investor’s annual income or net worth if either the 
investor’s annual income or net worth is less than $100,000”). 
59. See id. § 227.100(a)(2)(ii) (limiting the amount to “10 percent of the lesser
of the investor’s annual income or net worth . . . if both the investor’s annual income 
and net worth are equal to or more than $100,000”). 
60. See id. (limiting the amount to “10 percent of the lesser of the investor’s
annual income or net worth, not to exceed an amount sold of $100,000, if both the 
investor’s annual income and net worth are equal to or more than $100,000” 
(emphasis added)). 
61. See Regulation Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,494 (Nov. 16, 2015)
(“[A]n offering made in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) is not required to be integrated 
with another exempt offering . . . .”). 
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deliberate sequencing of a crowdfunding offering could also serve a 
vetting function for a later private placement.62 A similar funding-
begetting-funding situation may be possible if the fundraising 
monies are used to satisfy a lender that sufficient borrower’s equity 
is backing an enterprise.63 Avoiding the legal fees associated with 
ensuring integration compliance is yet another reason to prefer 
investment crowdfunding as a securities fundraising technique. 
D. The “How Else”: Intrastate Crowdfunding and SCOR Offerings 
Of course, crowdfunding at the federal level does not exist in a 
vacuum. Some of the reasons why “private placement exemptions 
[are] generally unavailable for crowdfunding transactions, which are 
intended to involve a large number of investors and not be limited 
to investors that meet specific qualifications,”64 have already been 
discussed. Issuers have several other options at the state level with 
which to raise funds. 
As of the end of 2016, thirty-three states have intrastate 
crowdfunding laws on the books.65 These laws may have significantly 
higher annual maximums than Reg CF.66 But they also come with 
restrictions that can compare unfavorably to their federal 
counterpart. These intrastate crowdfunding laws roughly fall into 
two models. 
62. This would be analogous in effect, if not cost, to the “testing the waters”
stage allowed in Regulation A+ offerings. See Michael Raneri, Testing the Waters and 
Filing a Regulation A+ Offering with the SEC, FORBES (May 26, 2015, 5:52 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mraneri/2015/05/26/testing-the-waters-and-filing-a 
-regulation-a-offering-with-the-sec/#435826499dec (“[T]he ‘Testing the Waters’ 
stage is relatively informal. Issuers can use public channels like social media or email 
to let investors know they’re considering offering securities . . . .”). 
63. A similar technique is included in the projections used for the MNvest
crowdfunding raise for Torg Brewery. See generally TORG BREWERY, LLC, INVESTOR
PACKAGE (Dec. 16, 2016) (on file with author). 
64. See Regulation Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,389.
65. See NASAA INTRASTATE OVERVIEW, supra note 6 (listing effective dates for
thirty-two laws, with Wyoming’s effective July 1, 2017). 
66. See Informed Investor Advisory: Crowdfunding, NASAA, 
http://www.nasaa.org/12842/informed-investor-advisory-crowdfunding/ (last 
updated May 2016) (“These amounts range from $100,000 to $4 million in a 12-
month period, and $100 to $100,000 per investor, unless accredited.”). 
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The first model is based on Rule 50467 and, depending on state 
law, traditionally allows an issuer to advertise the sale of registered 
securities to accredited and non-accredited investors.68 But the costs 
associated with creation and filing of registration materials can make 
this type of Rule 504 usage cost-prohibitive for business startups.69 
Other options under Regulation D might allow even freer sales of 
securities to accredited investors only. However, accredited investors 
do not a “crowd” make. 
The second model is based on section 3(a)(11) of the Securities 
Act plus SEC Rule 14770 and/or 147A.71 This model is by far the most 
common nationwide.72 Importantly, these laws do not currently 
allow for general advertising or solicitation via the Internet.73 That 
will soon change;74 but even once Internet advertising becomes 
67. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A.D (West, Westlaw through
2015 2d Reg. Sess.) (“The offering meets the requirements of the federal exemption 
. . . in 17 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 230.504 (2013). . . .”). 
68. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.50(b)(2) (2016) (“The securities offered must be
exempt from registration . . . pursuant to Rule 504 of Regulation D . . . .”); see also 
Fast Answers: Rule 504 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/rule504.htm (last updated Oct. 27, 2014). 
69. See Goodrich, supra note 33; see also SCOR Forms, NASAA,
http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/scor-overview 
/scor-forms/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (hosting downloadable forms for the 
“Small Corporate Offering Registration” or “SCOR” offering, including the 118-
question Form U-7). 
70. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 80A.461 (describing the MNvest statutory
codification, which requires compliance with both section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147). 
71. The recent creation of Rule 147A, with its exemption where intrastate
crowdfunders can freely advertise and solicit on the Internet, will likely mean that 
many states will consider amending their statutes. See Final Rules 147/147A, supra 
note 9. 
72. See NASAA INTRASTATE OVERVIEW, supra note 6.
73. One of the major reasons the SEC created Rule 147A as a standalone
exemption was because the existing Rule 147 acts as a safe harbor to section 
3(a)(11), which only works if all “offers” and “sales” are in-state. See Final Rules 
147/147A, supra note 9. State crowdfunding laws based on the section 3(a)(11) plus 
Rule 147 model thus effectively barred issuers from the use of the Internet. See Joyce, 
supra note 9, at 357–58. 
74. See, e.g., Georgia Quinn, Advertising, Social Media and the New World of
Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 20, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/01/30968-advertising-social-media-new 
-world-crowdfunding/ (“Although [retail crowdfunding is] not legal at this time, 
many people are preparing for crowdfunding permitted under Title III of the JOBS 
Act and currently proposed Regulation CF or ‘retail crowdfunding.’”). 
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permissible, issuers without a devoted single-state following may lack 
sufficient numbers of investors to access any kind of useful capital. 
To briefly summarize this overview, Reg CF offers a new and 
exciting way to raise capital for smaller issuers. A previously 
untapped group of investors is connected via modern technology to 
issuers who previously would have been unable to afford the costs of 
fundraising. Internet portals have been inserted as gatekeepers for 
investor protection and facilitation of offerings. There are also new 
restrictions, though. Investors and issuers are subject to relatively 
small investment and fundraising limits, and access to the offerings 
is highly structured. Intrastate alternatives provide even more 
options for the prospective issuer but are subject to unique statutory 
restrictions on advertising and solicitation. Thus, despite the 
numerous options for crowdfunding and crowdfunding-esqe 
fundraising, even the most deserving crowdfunding projects run the 
risk of failure if not crafted properly. Next, Part III will dissect some 
statistics of the first eight months of Reg CF offerings, with an eye 
toward recommending best practices in Part IV. 
III. REGULATION CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS BY THE NUMBERS
After a four-year-and-one-month delay during rulemaking, May 
16, 2016, marked the end of a long wait for Reg CF and the 
beginning of a new and exciting era in peer-to-peer investing.75 
Demand had certainly pent up, as that launch date presented ten 
active federal funding portals with approximately thirty-two 
offerings.76 Over the remainder of the year, the number of platforms 
would double, and the number of offerings would balloon to 186.77 
75. See Regulation Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015)
(“The final rules and forms are effective May 16, 2016 . . . .”); Neiss, supra note 4 
and accompanying text. 
76. See JD Alois, Week One: How Are Title III Crowdfunding Platforms Doing?,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (May 24, 2016, 10:01 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com 
/2016/05/86040-week-one-how-are-title-iii-crowdfunding-platforms-doing. 
77. The authors are grateful to Sherwood Neiss and the folks at Crowdfund
Capital Advisors (CCA) for the use of their data reporting on 2016 Reg CF offerings. 
CCA analyzed all 186 Form C filings with the SEC in 2016 and tracked the 
performance of issuers throughout. A recorded webinar summary of their findings, 
reported in substantial portion herein, is publicly available at Sherwood Neiss & 
Jason Best, CCA Grp., 2016 Regulation Crowdfunding Year End Analysis, YOUTUBE (Jan. 
11, 2017), https://youtu.be/j4sQpN1cJpE [hereinafter CCA Data]. Discussion of 
the 186 offerings begins about eight minutes into the video. Citations to other 
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In this Part, the article dives into the data behind all 186 offerings to 
uncover themes and ultimately offer takeaways in Part IV. 
It is worth noting at the outset that 186 offerings in an eight-
month period is still a relatively small sample size upon which to 
make judgments. Nonetheless, it is a large enough sample size to see 
storyline progress. For instance, the first storyline is that of 338 
offerings, 145 hit their minimum funding target.78 This equates to a 
43% success rate, a remarkably similar success rate to Kickstarter,79 
the predecessor in many ways to investment crowdfunding. 
Just as in a democracy where the public elects worthy candidates 
by voting, in crowdfunding the crowd “elects” worthy offerings by 
voting with their wallets.80 Based upon this early data, 58% of 
offerings are failing to meet their goal, and that is perfectly 
acceptable. The crowd, in its infinite wisdom, is deciding who is 
worthy of capital.81 
Some commentators may seek to exploit this failures data in 
order to prove Reg CF’s unworthiness. These commenters would be 
armed with the additional news that the Financial Industry 
commentators’ crowdfunding reports can be found at supra note 13. 
78. CCA Data, supra note 77.
79. See Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last visited
May 12, 2017) (reporting successful funding of 124,612 projects out of a total of 
352,636 project launches, a 35.34% success rate); CCA Regulation Crowdfunding 
Indices, supra note 13. 
80. Cf. John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act’s Strange Bedfellows: Democracy and
Start-Up Company Investing, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 357, 361 (2013). 
Like successful candidates in democratic elections, crowdfunding 
prowess derives from large numbers of equal followers, not from small 
groups of influential or wealthy contributors. It is democratic insofar as 
any idea that captures the attention of the crowd can attract substantial 
amounts of money, typically in low-dollar contributions from numerous 
people, similar to how politicians achieve electoral success in a 
democracy by winning the support of many voters who each casts a single 
vote. 
Id. 
81. It should be noted that the Reg CF statistics, while premature, are in line
with data from other countries, such as Australia. That is, a significant portion of all 
offerings are not ultimately successfully funded. Cf. Andy Kollmorgen, Crowdfunding 
Risks, Rewards and Regulation, CHOICE (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www 
.choice.com.au/money/financial-planning-and-investing/stock-market-investing 
/articles/crowdfunding-risks-and-rewards (comparing Australian platform 
Pozible’s claim of 55% success to Kickstarter’s 43% success in mid-2014). 
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Regulatory Authority (FINRA)- and SEC-registered portal, 
uFundingPortal, was shut down by administrative order—an 
Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (AWC) filed by FINRA—in 
November 2016 for not adhering to basic regulatory requirements.82 
Critics could characterize the fact that both of these important 
regulatory bodies missed uFundingPortal’s malfeasance as evidence 
that crowdfunding is somehow inherently risky and could never 
adequately protect investors. Yet, wiser observers counter that this is 
simply a healthy system ridding itself of unfit portals and issuers.83 
Nearly $18,000,000 in capital was invested into Reg CF issuers in 
the abbreviated time span of May 16, 2016, to December 31, 2016.84 
“This money was raised in a fraction of the time that it would have 
taken if these entrepreneurs had gone to venture capitalists. It was 
also raised by many companies that don’t qualify for VC capital 
because they don’t hit the sweet spot for VC investment.”85 This 
quote is especially powerful considering that many of the 2016 Reg 
CF issuers were (1) pure startup companies and/or (2) stemming 
from alternative industries.86 Either of these facts can be 
82. JD Alois, FINRA Action on uFundingPortal: Potential for Fraud Found on
Crowdfunding Platform, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2016, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/12/93663-finra-action-ufundingportal     
-potential-fraud-found-crowdfunding-platform. Notably, uFundingPortal had listed 
potentially fraudulent issuers that 
had an impractible [sic] business model, oversimplified and overly-
optimistic financial forecasts, and other warning signs. For example, 13 
of the issuers—despite having different business models—all 
coincidentally listed identical amounts for their target funding requests, 
maximum funding requests, price per share of stock, number of shares 
to be sold, total number of shares, and equity valuations. None of these 
13 issuers reported any assets or history of operations before May 2016, 
and each claimed an unrealistic, unwarrented [sic], and identical $5 
million equity valuation. 
Id. 
83. See Nathaniel Popper, Doubts Arise as Investors Flock to Crowdfunded Start-Ups,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/business 
/dealbook/crowdfunding-fraud-investing-startups.html (highlighting prominent 
crowdfunding consultant Sherwood Neiss, who said “that he was confident that the 
crowd had enough wisdom to screen out the bad companies and those that were 
not providing enough information”). 
84. CCA Data, supra note 77, at 8:13.
85. Neiss, supra note 4.
86. CCA Data, supra note 77.
17
Robins and Joyce: How to Crowdfund and Not Fall Flat on Your Face: Best Practices f
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
1076 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:5 
disqualifying from a venture capital perspective, where mature 
companies from the technology industry fare best.87 
Among the top six industries in 2016 Reg CF offerings, farming 
and fishing, wine and spirits, transportation, and food and beverage 
were all represented.88 One would be hard pressed to find any data 
supporting strong venture capital interest in any of the 
aforementioned industries. Healthcare and entertainment/media 
were also represented; however, those industries have never shied 
from venture capital.89 
What may be most astounding from the 2016 Reg CF results is 
the average number of investors per closed offering, which was 331.90 
Whereas a traditional “friends and family” private round 
conservatively may yield ten to twenty investors, we are seeing an 
increase on the order of more than ten times that so far in Reg CF 
offerings.91 The question is whether such a large influx of investors 
into a young and presumably small company is feasible and 
sustainable in the long run. What’s more, will future investors balk 
at such a large capitalization table? For this reason and others, some 
issuers, often with the help of a funding portal, create a special 
87. See Niall McCarthy, Which Industries Attract the Most Venture Capital?, FORBES
(June 27, 2016, 9:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2016 
/06/27/which-industries-attract-the-most-venture-capital-infographic (“[S]oftware 
receives the largest slice of the VC pie by a considerable distance, accounting for 
36.2 percent (nearly $12 billion) of all investment over the past year. Biotechnology 
was in second place with 17.3 percent ($5.7 billion) while media and entertainment 
rounded off the top three with 9.5 percent ($3.2 billion).”); Dileep Rao, Why 
99.95% of Entrepreneurs Should Stop Wasting Time Seeking Venture Capital, FORBES (July 
22, 2013, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2013/07/22/why 
-99-95-of-entrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-time-seeking-venture-capital (“Most 
VCs like to invest in ventures after the potential has been proven and the risk 
reduced.”). 
88. CCA Data, supra note 77.
89. See PWC/CB INSIGHTS, MONEYTREE REPORT Q4 AND FULL-YEAR 2016 13
(2016), http://pwc.to/2jbyJMd. 
90. CCA Data, supra note 77.
91. Cf. Miguel Vega, What Is the Difference Between “Friends and Family”, Seed and
Series A Financings?, COOLEY GO, https://www.cooleygo.com/difference-friends 
-family-seed-series-financings/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (describing the 
differences between various start-up options). 
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purpose entity (SPE) in order to house investors.92 Part IV takes a 
deeper look into the unique solutions and issues created by SPEs.93  
The explanation for large numbers of average investors per 
closed offering is largely related to the average commitment per 
investor at only $833.94 At this rate, a company would need well over 
a thousand investors to reach the maximum raise of $1,000,000. This 
dollar amount is achieved by low minimum investment amounts set 
by issuers.95 Certain psychological theory contends that whichever 
amount is set as the minimum is what the majority of investors 
choose as their investment amount.96 This phenomenon is called 
“anchoring,” where a cognitive bias influences a person to rely too 
heavily on the first piece of information received.97 
Applied to investment crowdfunding, anchoring impacts issuers 
in that a certain portion of investors can be expected to invest the 
minimum, to take a flyer on an interesting opportunity.98 It is tough 
to estimate how many investors will choose the minimum, but in one 
recent state crowdfunded offering, 75% of the investors invested the 
minimum investment amount of $5000.99 Issuers ought to be 
cognizant of this effect and not set the minimum too low. 
92. Amy Wam & Jillian Sidoti, Why “Special Purpose Entities” Are So Special,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com 
/2016/09/90049-special-purpose-entities-special/. 
93. See infra Part IV.
94. CCA Data, supra note 77.
95. See David M. Freeman, $100 Minimum Investment Levels Will Drive Socially
Motivated Investing, FIN. POISE (July 6, 2016), https://www.financialpoise.com 
/columns/crowdfunding-for-investors/100-minimum-investment-levels-will-drive     
-socially-motivated-investing/. 
96. See Albert Phung, Behavioral Finance: Key Concepts—Anchoring, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/behavioral_finance/behavioral4.asp 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
97. See Linda Sapadin, The Anchoring Effect: How It Impacts Your Everyday Life,
PSYCHCENTRAL: WORLD OF PSYCHOL. (July 27, 2013), http://psychcentral.com/blog 
/archives/2013/07/27/the-anchoring-effect-how-it-impacts-your-everyday-life/. 
98. See The Guide to Equity Crowdfunding, CROWDFUNDER, https://blog
.crowdfunder.com/crowdfunding-startups/the-guide-to-equity-crowdfunding/ 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
99. UNMAPPED BREWING CO., INVESTOR PACKAGE (Sept. 9, 2015) (on file with
author); see also Investing in Unmapped Brewing, UNMAPPED BREWING, 
http://www.unmappedbrewing.com/#investing-unmapped-brewing (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2017) (indicating minimum investment of $5000). Author Zach Robins was 
counsel for Unmapped during this offering. 
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Yet, positive trends indicate that the minimum investment per 
Reg CF offering is increasing.100 When Reg CF launched in May 
2016, the average commitment per investor was $750.101 Excepting a 
small dip shortly thereafter, the minimum commitment only 
continued to grow through the end of year.102 It is expected that the 
average commitment will reach $1000 in 2017, which is an 
encouraging development from the viewpoint of investor-relations 
management.103 
Company valuation is another key factor in seeking investors. 
This vital component of an offering sets the worth of a company and 
effectively determines what “piece of the pie” equity investors will be 
receiving in exchange for cash.104 The data shows that despite a 
handful of outliers, valuations for Reg CF offerings have a median of 
$5,300,000,105 which is in line with venture capital seed stage 
valuations at $5,900,000 (using the most recently available data).106 
This Reg CF valuation data point is especially encouraging, because 
in a Reg CF offering the issuers are able to set the valuation, whereas 
in a venture capital transaction the investors set the valuation.107 Since 
Reg CF issuers now hold more leverage in setting deal terms, there 
was the possibility of abuse from early issuers. However, once again 
the data shows Reg CF valuations were not only in-line with, but 
actually less than, seed stage venture capital valuations.108 




104. Suspiciously high valuations are also cause for concern when an issuer’s 
business operations cannot support them. Cf. Alois, supra note 82 (illustrating how 
a pattern of identical and identically-unsupported valuations—due to identical 
absence of operating histories—ultimately piqued regulators’ suspicions at 
uFundingPortal). 
 105. This number excludes three outlier campaigns. With these campaigns 
included, the valuation increases to $8.9M. See Neiss, supra note 4. 
 106. GARRET JAMES BLACK, PITCHBOOK, 1H 2016 VC VALUATIONS REPORT 7
(2016), http://files.pitchbook.com/pdf/PitchBook_1H_2016_VC_Valuations 
_Report.pdf. 
 107. See generally Goncalo de Vasconcelos, Valuations in Crowdfunding: Are We All 
Barking Mad?, FORBES (May 27, 2015, 3:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com 
/sites/goncalodevasconcelos/2015/05/27/valuations-in-crowdfunding-are-we-all    
-barking-mad/#52a4dae55424 (describing the disparity in valuation between 
company-led crowdfunding platforms versus investor-led platforms). 
108. It should be noted that “seed stage” venture capital is the category most 
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It is worth noting that certain industries in particular skewed the 
Reg CF valuations. For instance, not surprisingly, software was more 
than double the average valuation at $12,125,000.109 Renewable 
energy offerings, perhaps due to the industry’s nascence, rounded 
out the bottom end with $1,195,000 as the average valuation.110 
Transportation and farming and fishing sectors represented the 
extreme outliers at $29,975,000 and $30,652,600, respectively.111 
Yet valuations seen in a vacuum do not tell the complete story 
since other variables weigh heavily on company value—namely, age 
and maturity. To wit, the companies most successful at raising capital 
under Reg CF happen to be companies that are more than six years 
old.112 Specifically, companies six to seven years old had the highest 
average capital committed at $420,965, and companies more than 
ten years old ranked second at $336,175.113 Clearly, when it comes to 
average capital committed, older is better. Nonetheless, the plurality 
of companies (39%) raising capital through Reg CF are less than one 
year old.114 These same companies pulled in 43.5% of all Reg CF 
capital committed.115 While the average capital committed, at 
$251,198 per campaign, is far less, comparatively, than the average 
for older companies, it is evident that Reg CF is well designed for 
pure startups, which is the stage at which companies are most 
challenged to raise capital.116 
Another factor traditionally tied to valuation is company sales.117 
It remains to be seen how many of the Reg CF issuers had sales at the 
launch of their campaigns. If Regulation A+ (Title IV of the JOBS 
Act) is any indicator, many of these companies do not have any 
revenue at all at the time of offering.118 
apropos to Reg CF offerings, yet some issuers may be better suited for Pitchbook’s 
Series A category. Cf. BLACK, supra note 106, at 10–11. 








117. See, e.g., id. 
118. Cf. RICHARD SWART, THE EVOLUTION OF INVESTMENT CROWDFUNDING: EARLY
DATA AND INSIGHTS, TITLE IV REG A+ 8 (2016), https://www.scribd.com/document 
/327099379/NextGenCrowdfundingRegA-WhitePaper-October62016 (finding 
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The average capital committed per successful campaign was 
$226,578, and the median minimum funding target was $50,000.119 
These successful campaigns took an average of forty-five days to hit 
the minimum and an average of ninety-seven days to hit the 
maximum.120 For all Reg CF campaigns, the median length was 108 
days, and the average length was 132 days.121 
In the aggregate, companies younger than four years in age 
raised approximately 77% of Reg CF capital.122 It will be interesting 
to see whether older companies (in this case companies four years 
and older) will comprise a larger portion of Reg CF issuers in the 
future. As Reg CF becomes more well known as a financing option, 
presumably more established companies will take advantage. 
A total of 21,550 investors committed capital through all 186 
Reg CF offerings.123 Nearly 68% of the investors were represented by 
one single federal funding portal, Wefunder.124 Some experts 
believe that more than 43,000 investors will participate in Reg CF in 
2017.125 
Reg CF issuers need to be aware of the costs of raising capital, 
with one of the largest costs being fees paid to the federal funding 
portal.126 These platform costs were on average $11,239 per 
successful campaign.127 Some portals also receive compensation in 
the form of warrants (in order to participate in the upside), 
miscellaneous fees, and expense reimbursement.128 Wefunder and 
that seventy-nine of the 131 offerings studied were by firms reporting no revenue). 





124. Id.; cf. The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 12 (reporting 
that Wefunder offerings account for 67% of investment volume, 65% of successful 
offerings, and 68% of total investments, as of February 12, 2017). According to CCA, 
Wefunder represented 14,622 of Reg CF investors. CCA Data, supra note 77. 
125. CCA Data, supra note 77. 
126. See Louis A. Bevilacqua, How Much Does It Cost to Raise Money Through Equity 
Crowdfunding?, BEVILACQUA BLOG (Sept. 26, 2016), 
http://bevilacquapllc.com/much-cost-raise-money-equity-crowdfunding/ (stating 
that the fee paid to a portal is typically between three and six percent of the amount 
raised, proportionally more than other fees). 
 127. Id. For an industry-wide comparison of portal costs, see The Current Status 
of Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 12. 
128. CCA Data, supra note 77. Warrants give the company something similar to 
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Mr. Crowd have taken the low fee approach, hoping to make up for 
lost revenue in the future by focusing on market saturation now.129  
Of the twenty-one federal funding portals approved by the SEC 
and FINRA, there has been only one failure to date: uFundingPortal 
(UFP LLC).130 FINRA banned the portal in December 2016 due to 
its failure to properly vet issuers, who, as it turns out, were not 
compliant with SEC regulations.131 
an option, where they buy shares later but on terms defined now. Letting portals 
take compensation in warrants means that issuers do not have to immediately shell 
out some money from the Reg CF offering to pay the portals. See Reem Heakal, 
Warrants: A High-Return Investment Tool, INVESTOPEDIA (July 4, 2017, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/04/021704.asp. 
129. See, e.g., The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 12. 
130. See Alois, supra note 82. 
131. This noncompliance seems too egregious and widespread to qualify as an 
innocent mistake. 
[uFundingPortal] reviewed and in some cases assisted in the 
preparation of required paperwork filed with the SEC by 16 different 
issuers that offered securities through UFP’s platform. UFP knew that 
none of the 16 issuers had filed the following required disclosures with 
the SEC: 
(1) a description of the business of the issuer, and the anticipated 
business plan of the issuer; 
(2) a description of the purpose and intended use of the offering 
proceeds; 
(3) a description of the ownership and capital structure of the issuer; 
(4) a discussion of the issuer’s financial condition; 
(5) all positions and offices with the issuer held by the directors and 
officers (and any persons occupying a similar status or performing a 
similar function). The [sic] period of time in which such persons 
served in the position or office and their business experience during 
the past three years; 
(6) a description of how the exercise of rights held by the principal 
shareholders of the issuer could affect the purchasers of the 
securities being offered; 
(7) the risks to purchasers of the securities relating to minority 
ownership in the issuer and the risks associated with corporate 
actions including additional issuances of securities, issuer 
repurchases of securities, a sale of the issuer or of assets of the issuer 
or transactions with related parties; 
(8) a description of the restrictions on transfer of the securities; 
(9) a discussion of the material factors that make an investment in 
the issuer speculative or risky; and 
(10) a description of the process to complete the transaction or 
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In the aggregate, the funding portals are averaging four new 
campaigns per week.132 Wefunder was the most prevalent portal out 
of the gate, launching the most offerings on day one, and continued 
the trend through year end, representing 29% of all campaigns.133 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR CROWDFUNDING
OFFERINGS 
Although Reg CF is in its infancy and funding models are still 
being tweaked and tested, there are nonetheless many lessons to be 
learned.134 Ideally, prospective issuers and portal operators can 
benefit from such best practices and continue to refine their 
methods, meanwhile providing feedback to the investment 
crowdfunding community. It is going to “take a village” in order to 
bring Reg CF and other forms of investment crowdfunding to the 
forefront and consciousness of average citizens. By collaborating and 
sharing best practices, hopefully the rising tide will lift all boats. 
By and large, the most important advice to any company 
contemplating investment crowdfunding is the most traditional, yet 
obvious advice: ensure the business plan is well thought out and 
thorough, as investors will quickly see through gaping holes or 
inexact assumptions. Certainly the ultimate success of the 
crowdfunded business may depend largely on the collective 
experience of the founders.135 However, thoughtful planning and a 
cancel an investment commitment. 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent 
(No. 2016051563901) from Gary Shao, Managing Dir. of uFundingPortal, to Dept. 
of Enforcement, FINRA (Nov. 25, 2016), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files 
/fda_documents/2016051563901_FDA_JG411996.pdf. 
132. CCA Data, supra note 77. 
 133. See id.; cf. The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 12 
(reporting that Wefunder has hosted ninety-nine campaigns as of May 15, 2017). 
134. The authors were unable to find other examples like this data-driven 
analysis in academic literature. This is probably unsurprising, given the limited time 
frame and limited number of offerings to date. The authors hope that this article is 
the first of many to periodically review and reassess the efficiency of crowdfunding 
models. 
 135. See, e.g., Nathan Pierce, MicroBrewr 066: How to Get an SBA Loan for a Startup 
Brewery, MICROBREWR (May 26, 2015), http://microbrewr.com/how-to-get-sba-loan 
-for-startup-brewery/ (“[T]he ideal candidate should have experience working in a 
commercial brewery . . . . If you’re a homebrewer wanting to get an SBA loan, it 
could help to have awards for your beer.”). 
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well-rounded team can often make up for inexperience and pay 
dividends in the end. Fortunately, Reg CF requires disclosures 
including a “description of the issuer’s business [plan]” to protect 
investors.136 Rather than seeing such disclosures as a burdensome 
obligation, issuers ought to embrace the challenge and see this is an 
opportunity design a strong and viable business plan. 
The SEC also mandates that issuers provide “a reasonably 
detailed description of the purpose of the offering, such that 
investors . . . understand how the offering proceeds will be used.”137 
Here, the early insight shows how critical a low and achievable 
minimum funding target is to success. As evidenced by Reg CF data 
to date, if the issuer struggles to raise its minimum amount within 
forty-five days, the likelihood of ultimately closing on funding is 
diminished.138 Once again, this advice is obvious, but some may 
struggle to apply it to their offering. The clear solution is to provide 
investors with three scenarios: worst case, average case, and best case. 
This three-tiered structure grants issuers the flexibility to execute on 
effectively different roll-outs of the business plan, contingent on how 
much capital is raised. For instance, an issuer could (1) in the worst 
case, lease premises and equipment; (2) in the average case, lease 
premises but purchase equipment; or (3) in the best case, purchase 
both premises and equipment. Even though company founders may 
prefer to purchase both premises and equipment, they would be 
better served by at least considering a worst case scenario, because 
they will sooner find themselves on the road to a successful offering. 
With respect to minimum investments per investor, our advice 
is somewhat counter to the previous paragraph, in that a minimum 
too low may backfire on the company. This strategy once again 
relates to the psychological theory of anchoring, wherein an investor 
who, for example, otherwise may invest $2000 in a company instead 
settles for the bare minimum $1000.139 Under this scenario, the 
issuer has lost half of the potential investment and will require twice 
 136. 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(d) (2016); Regulation Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 
71,388, 71,390 (Nov. 16, 2015). 
137. Regulation Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,401 (Part 
II.B.1(a)(1)(c)(iii)).
138. CCA Data, supra note 77. One hundred thirty-two days is the average length
of all Reg CF campaigns. Id. One hundred eight days is median length of Reg CF 
campaigns to date. Id. 
139. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
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the number of potential investors.140 Now, it is also admittedly true 
that the higher the minimum investment per investor, the smaller 
the actual pool of willing and able investors. This is a fine line to 
walk, but as in any securities offering it is the company’s role to figure 
out the “sweet spot”: where enough investors are able to participate, 
yet the investment level is not too low. 
Our advice is not to dip below $1000 per investor in an equity 
offering and to preferably hover between $2500 and $5000, if 
possible. For most offerings, this strategy will yield a capitalization 
table of one hundred investors or less,141 which we believe is 
manageable. Once a founder, especially an unseasoned one, is left 
to manage investors in the triple digits, the founder may find his or 
her time and resources are too often being spent managing investor 
questions, expectations, and administrative tasks, such as transfers of 
interest. Additionally, issuers who are able to inform the crowd that 
only one hundred investors at the very maximum will be permitted 
to invest may benefit from the competition created to fill those spots. 
And, in the event one or more investors purchase a large amount of 
shares, the number of investors permitted could radically drop.142 
Absent a reasonably high minimum and cap on total number of 
investors, issuers may find themselves with close to one thousand 
investors,143 an untenable situation for some. 
A strategy often suggested to curb the issues arising from the 
sheer number of non-accredited investors on the company’s cap 
table is to create a special purpose entity (SPE).144 The main 
 140. As mentioned briefly in Section II.A, supra, the size of the issuer’s network 
can play a major role in the ultimate success of a crowdfunding offering. 
 141. This estimate is the result of a comparison of the average committed and 
successful capital numbers from the text accompanying supra notes 116 and 119 
(approximately $251,000 and $226,000, respectively) and dividing by $2500. 
 142. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2)(ii) (2016) (allowing an annual investment of 
up to $100,000 for the wealthiest investors). 
 143. E.g., Cleveland Whiskey, WEFUNDER, 
https://wefunder.com/cleveland.whiskey (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (displaying a 
successful offering that raised $711,787 from 952 investors). 
 144. Note that SPEs are prohibited under the Final Rules for Reg CF, but 
proposed legislation, the Crowdfunding Enhancement Act, S. 1031, 115th Cong. 
(2017), includes a reversal of this ban; this bill was previously proposed as the Fix 
Crowdfunding Act in 2016 but did not make it out of the Senate, despite being 
passed by the House. See Anthony Zeoli, The Fix Crowdfunding Act. What It Fixes & 
What It Does Not, CROWDFUND INSIDER (July 28, 2016, 5:45 PM), https:// 
www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/07/88536-fix-crowdfunding-act-fixes-not/. 
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objectives to this structure are to (1) only show one investor on the 
issuer’s capitalization table; (2) effectively silence the investors from 
a corporate governance standpoint; and (3) prevent a secondary 
market from forming where investors are trading company shares.145 
This strategy has mixed consequences in the crowdfunding 
context.146 On one hand, SPEs are a strategy worth considering from 
the issuer’s perspective, because management of the company will 
potentially run more smoothly and future (more sophisticated) 
investors may appreciate the smaller capitalization table. On the 
other hand, however, crowdfunded investors may get wise to some 
of the inherent concerns related to SPEs, such as (1) Who is creating 
the SPE?; (2) Who is managing the SPE?; (3) Who is covering the 
costs related to the SPE?; and (4) How should transfers of interests 
in the SPE be dealt with? On this last question, the most pressing 
concern is that investing in a private company is an inherently 
illiquid proposition. So, offering investment in an illiquid entity that 
itself owns interests in an illiquid entity seems to do a disservice to 
unsophisticated investors. Having said all of this, there are examples 
where SPEs are apparently working.147 
Shifting to another truism of investment crowdfunding, we now 
discuss the adage that an issuer should raise as much as it can—
typically in the form of verbal commitments—before 
commencement of the offering.148 Anecdotally, this often shakes out 
to 30–40% of capital committed prior to the launch of the campaign. 
As a verbal commitment of course, investors are not obligated to 
145. Id. 
146. See id. 
147. For example, 
PeerRealty invests as a single limited member into a sponsor’s Limited 
Liability Company (“LLC”) or Limited Partnership (“LP”). All 
PeerRealty investors are pooled into a special purpose [entity], typically 
an LLC, and then PeerRealty subscribes to the sponsor’s entity as a single 
investor. This means the sponsor is only responsible for one report, one 
distribution and one K-1. PeerRealty processes all of the underlying 
reports, distributions and K-1s for our investors. 
Education: Sponsor Questions, PEERREALTY, https://peerrealty.com/pages/education 
(click “How are investments structured?” under “Sponsor Questions”) (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2017). 
 148. Of course, issuers may not officially solicit for investments until the Form 
C offering statement has been filed with the SEC. See Regulation Crowdfunding, 80 
Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,423 (Nov. 16, 2015). 
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follow through on their promise.149 Nonetheless, assuming a large 
portion of the commitments does indeed invest, the issuer can ride 
that wave of investors towards a successful closing. This concept is 
best known as the bandwagon effect, where someone is more likely 
to perform an action if others have, too.150 In more modern times, 
this has also been termed “FOMO,” or the “fear of missing out.”151 
Applied to crowdfunding, if individuals see across their social 
networks that friends and acquaintances support a campaign, they 
are more likely to follow suit. 
A similar strategy to pre-funding a campaign with verbal 
commitments is funding via a convertible note bridge financing.152 
The capital raised here funds company operations and campaign-
related expenses153 during the campaign. In a common scenario, the 
issuer offers “friends and family” superior investment terms to the 
crowdfunded offering round.154 These investors are rewarded for 
backing the company at a somewhat riskier stage by receiving a 
conversion discount on the back end.155 
 149. See The Guide to Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 98 (discussing the art of 
closing a deal with an investor). 
 150. See Bandwagon Effect, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms 
/b/bandwagon-effect.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
 151. See FOMO, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/FOMO (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
 152. Convertible notes are debt instruments paying interest with a firm maturity 
but with the unique quality of converting into equity securities of the issuer upon a 
certain “trigger” such as a sales benchmark or Series A Financing. Compare Gordon 
Daugherty, Using Verbal Commitments to Secure Your First Investors, 
SHOCKWAVEINNOVATIONS (Dec. 27, 2016), https://shockwaveinnovations.com 
/2016/12/27/using-verbal-commits-to-secure-your-first-investors/ (explaining the 
use of verbal commitments to secure investments), with Antone Johnson, Convertible 
Note Financing 101 for Startups, BOTTOM LINE L. GROUP: MASHTAG BLAWG (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://www.bottomlinelawgroup.com/2011/10/31/convertible-note 
-financing/ (discussing convertible note financing). 
 153. These campaign-related expenses can include, for example, legal, 
accounting, marketing, public relations, and portal fees. 
154. See, e.g., How to Set Conversion Discounts in Convertible Notes, STARTUP LAW. 
(Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.startuplawyer.com/seed-rounds/how-to-set 
-conversion-discounts-in-convertible-notes. A common example is a conversion 
“discount” of somewhere between ten and twenty-five percent. Effectively, upon 
closing of an equity crowdfunded investment round, the convertible note investors 
can buy shares or units at $0.80 or $0.90 on the dollar. 
155. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 152 (discussing conversion discounts). 
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One of the paramount considerations for issuers is the legal 
structure of their company. Issuers typically choose between limited 
liability companies (LLCs) and C Corporations (C-Corps) as the two 
most common entity types.156 However, more and more “public 
benefit corporations” (B-Corps) or some variant thereof are being 
used as a means to provide some social good in addition to profits.157 
C-Corps, despite double taxation, are the most used entities for 
raising capital, with 73% of all Reg CF offerings, according to CCA.158 
Further, of security types, common stock is the most widely used, 
representing over 47% of all C-Corp offerings.159 Additionally, 
common stock offerings represent the most capital closed upon 
through Reg CF offerings to date, accounting for over $3.6 
million.160 Meanwhile, for LLCs, common membership units as a 
security type raised the most capital under Reg CF, accounting for 
22%.161 The lesson to be learned here is that simple financing 
structures—like corporations raising capital via common stock—
offer the best opportunities to raise capital in the short term.162 
156. CCA Data, supra note 77. 
 157. Id. At a higher level of abstraction, apparently even crowdfunding 
platforms themselves are reincorporating as B-Corps. See JD Alois, Saving the 
American Dream: Wefunder Becomes a Public Benefit Corporation, CROWDFUND INSIDER 
(Nov. 2, 2016, 8:10 AM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/11/91963 
-saving-american-dream-wefunder-becomes-public-benefit-corporation/; Alison 
Griswold, Kickstarter Wants to Be Sure You Know How Much Good It’s Doing, SLATE:
MONEY BOX (Sept. 21, 2015, 4:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox 
/2015/09/21/kickstarter_incorporates_as_a_public_benefit_corporation_that 
_supports_creative.html. 
158. CCA Data, supra note 77. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. ($1.73M out of $7.7M). 
162. Over time, the crowd may become more sophisticated and open to 
alternative security types such as SAFEs and more complicated debt securities. 
SAFEs were designed by incubators in Silicon Valley. See Startup Documents, Y 
COMBINATOR (Feb. 2016), https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/. They 
represent a significant portion of total crowdfunding offerings, both for 
corporations and LLCs. See CCA Data, supra note 77. However, commentators have 
mixed reactions as to whether SAFEs are appropriate for unsophisticated investors. 
Compare Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe SAFE, 
102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168 (2016), with Amy Wan, When You Use a Bomb to Swat a Fly: 
A Response to the Proposal of Banning SAFEs in Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND INSIDER 
(Sept. 27, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/09/90501 
-use-bomb-swat-fly-response-proposal-banning-safes-crowdfunding/, and Joe Green 
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In addition to focusing on traditional security and entity types, 
issuers would be wise to incorporate investor perks into their 
campaigns, such as access to special company products and services. 
Melding Kickstarter-like rewards into investment crowdfunding 
campaigns can yield increased enthusiasm from investors.163 
Examples include free growlers from breweries164 and promotional 
discounts on certain products.165 
Campaigns will also see more success from strong video 
presentations accompanying their offering documents, once again 
according to CCA data.166 Early evidence shows that campaigns with 
no video or a video with poor production quality fared worse in 
terms of raising capital.167 CCA’s analysis of the videos, although 
purely subjective, determined that campaigns with videos scoring an 
eight or higher on a scale of ten were most likely to reach the 
minimum funding target.168 So, the takeaway for issuers is to invest 
marketing dollars into videos in order to create an emotional 
connection with the audience.169 
Social network reach has been shown to be a critical component 
to campaign success.170 Data aggregated from CCA cross-referenced 
& John Coyle, When It Comes to Retail Crowdfunding, SAFEty First, CROWDFUND INSIDER 
(Oct. 26, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/10/91609 
-when-it-comes-to-retail-crowdfunding-safety-first/. 
 163. In fact, there are those who argue that rewards in some sense are essential 
to any crowdfunding raise. See Kathleen Minogue, What Rewards Can Teach Equity 
Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND BETTER (July 25, 2016), 
http://crowdfundbetter.com/rewards-can-teach-equity-crowdfunding/ (arguing 
that rewards are a way to build essential “social proof” of concept). 
164. See, e.g., Invest in Hawaii Cider Company, WEFUNDER, 
https://wefunder.com/hawaiicider (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (giving free growlers 
to individuals investing $1000 or more in the company). 
 165. See, e.g., Invest in My Trail, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/mytrail (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2017) (offering lifetime 20% discounts to investors of $1000 or 
more). 
166. CCA Data, supra note 77. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. In fact, campaigns that had any video outperformed campaigns with no 
video by a factor of almost 11:1. See id. (reporting videoless campaigns at $1,497,218 
and campaigns with video at $16,447,251). 
 169. In many ways, this emotional connection is tied in with the concept of 
“social proof.” See Minogue, supra note 163. 
 170. This is not unique to equity crowdfunding. Rewards crowdfunding 
campaigns also depend on extensive social network reach. See 18 Factors that Impact 
How Much You’ll Raise Through Crowdfunding, USEED, https://useed.org/18-factors 
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against Reg CF campaigns indicates that it takes approximately 3225 
connections across company founders’ social networks in order to 
raise $50,000.171 Extrapolated further, it takes 9275 connections to 
raise $250,000 and over 16,000 connections to raise $750,000.172 
Although there are certainly exceptions to this rule, it is very clear 
that the wider the reach a company has in social networks—whether 
it be Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, or the next hot platform—the 
higher the likelihood of raising capital. 
Another obvious statement, though worth noting, is that issuers 
should avoid both launching campaigns and spending advertising 
dollars on the weekends and right before holidays, as both 
timeframes equate to low investor engagement, according to CCA.173 
Conversely, data shows that launching and/or marketing in the 
middle of the week leads to the highest level of investor 
engagement.174 
Similar to reward-based crowdfunding campaigns on 
Kickstarter and IndieGoGo, constant and timely communication 
with investors is key.175 According to CCA, “companies that 
communicated with their investors saw higher valuations than those 
companies that did not communicate.”176 The lesson learned is that 
providing progress updates engages investors, builds trust, and leads 
to more capital invested. 
In conclusion, there is no one package, plan, or product that 
will guarantee issuers success. Rather, there are suggested best 
practices to follow both before and during offerings to increase the 
likelihood of reaching minimum funding. Such practices include, 
but are not limited to (1) simple, easy to digest securities such as 
common stock; (2) traditional entity structure in the form of a 
corporation; (3) large social networks for the directors and officers 
to tap into; (4) strong video production; and perhaps most 
importantly, (5) gaining pre-commitments from family and friends 
prior to launch.177 We acknowledge that these conclusions may be 
-impact-much-youll-raise-crowdfunding/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
171. CCA Data, supra note 77. 





177. Id. Preferably the pre-commitments are accomplished by a non-integrated 
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somewhat premature in this very nascent industry. All the same, we 
hope that these recommendations might provide issuers and their 
counsel with useful starting points when considering how to use 
investment crowdfunding. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE FUTURE OF CROWDFUNDING 
In conclusion, investment crowdfunding offers an exciting 
opportunity for small issuers to access a previously untapped (and 
arguably untappable) pool of capital. Based on the first eight months 
of offerings, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions; as each 
Part above includes a brief summary, they need not be repeated 
here. Investment crowdfunding is also an area ripe for immediate 
and ongoing research to see how businesses perform after the capital 
raise, especially as more offerings close (or fail to close) on funds. 
In the meantime, it is incumbent upon lawmakers to pass 
legislation improving upon and easing the capital-raising process. 
Namely, the Crowdfunding Enhancement Act attempts to fix, 
among other issues, the SPE prohibition discussed above.178 
Additionally, the Crowdfunding Enhancement Act has 
contemplated increasing the $1,000,000 Reg CF funding limit.179 We 
think these are sensible proposals for immediate action. 
At the state level, amendments to many of the thirty-plus 
intrastate investment crowdfunding offerings are currently 
convertible note offering. 
 178. See Crowdfunding Enhancement Act, S. 1031, 115th Cong. (2017), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1031. 
 179. See id. § 2. Throughout Europe, where investment crowdfunding has 
matured over the past decade, maximums up to $5 million are standard. JEFF LYNN
& BEN THORN, CROWDFUNDING LEGISLATION REFORM: WHAT IS NEEDED AND WHY 2 
(2016) (on file with author). 
If the burdens placed on issuers make raising capital through investment 
crowdfunding significantly more expensive, time‐consuming or 
otherwise difficult than raising money through other channels (such as 
institutional or private angel investors), the consequence is not just 
higher costs to the issuers. Instead, it will cause businesses only to turn 
to crowdfunding as a last resort after more efficient capital­raising 
methods have failed. The result will be that ordinary retail investors will 
have access only to those businesses that cannot raise capital elsewhere 
and that, by implication, have the least chance of success. 
 Id. at 1. 
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underway180 in order to (1) accommodate the new Rule 147A and 
(2) benefit from Rule 504’s higher ceiling of $5,000,000. 
We are also encouraged by the prospects of a new SEC chair 
intent on decreasing regulation in this space.181 With the current 
President’s wealth of business experience,182 together with the 
Republican-majority Congress that generally supports his platform 
of business de-regulations,183 perhaps we are embarking on a golden 
era of private capital funding. 
However, if we are to raise over $100,000,000 in Reg CF capital 
as some have suggested,184 a lack of public awareness would still hold 
us back. Making the public more cognizant of this new avenue to 
raise capital will take time, creative marketing campaigns, and 
perhaps the good luck of a Reg CF issuer taking a meteoric rise. The 
next chapter in the story of crowdfunding should be titled: Onward! 
VI. POSTSCRIPT: BEST PRACTICES FOR INVESTING IN THE NEXT
GENERATION OF BUSINESS LAWYERS 
Editor’s Note: After writing this article and as the authors prepared to 
participate in the symposium associated with this issue of the Mitchell 
Hamline Law Review, “Lawyers as Business Leaders: The Unique Skills, 
Knowledge, and Perspective of a Legal Education,” the authors compiled the 
following reflections on the symposium topic. 
A symposium on how well law schools prepare the next 
generation of business lawyers is either extremely timely or long 
 180. See, e.g., H.F. No. 444, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Minn. 2017), 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/bill.php?b=House&f=HF0444&ssn=0&y=2017 
(proposed 2017 MNvest amendment). 
 181. See Connie Loizos, Why Silicon Valley Is High-Fiving over Trump’s SEC Pick, 
TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 26, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/26/why-silicon 
-valley-is-high-fiving-over-trumps-sec-pick/ (predicting that under nominee Walter 
“Jay” Clayton’s leadership, “the pace of deal-making will accelerate . . . including on 
crowdfunding platforms”). 
 182. See Brody Mullins & John D. McKinnon, In Donald Trump’s Washington, 
Business Lobbyists Champ at the Bit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-win-puts-range-of-business-interests-back-in     
-play-1484044223 (discussing the current climate of excitement among U.S. 
businesses in anticipation of Trump’s business-friendly policy). 
183. Diane Stafford & Mark Davis, Obamacare, Numerous Regulations Face Trump 
Reversals, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 9, 2016, 5:50 PM), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/article113776653.html. 
184. CCA Data, supra note 77. 
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overdue, depending on who you ask. In some ways, a dialogue of how 
best to introduce young people into the ranks of our esteemed 
profession will always be relevant regardless of the particular focus, 
and it is our pleasure to contribute here. But in recent years, it has 
become patently clear that the role of lawyers, in business 
particularly, is changing. In general, it can no longer be assumed 
that the only pinnacle of law school success is a big firm job in private 
practice. 
More and more lawyers are asked to step into leadership 
positions in-house, and that has brought with it heavier ethical 
responsibilities and higher expectations that lawyers speak the 
language of business. Technological breakthroughs have begun to 
replace some of the functions traditionally filled by junior attorneys. 
Today’s business-focused law school graduate will be expected to 
speak fluently not only in legal issue-spotting, but also in balance 
sheets, corporate strategy, and industry politics. 
To their credit, many law schools are already adjusting course 
to adapt to this new reality. We offer some thoughts below about the 
best of these trends and some suggestions as to where there might 
be room for improvement. These thoughts, of course, are influenced 
by personal experience and should therefore be received with 
deserved grains of salt. Feel free to disagree or demand more 
explanation as you wish. 
Zach Robins: These days, I interact with law school via the 
summer associates at the law firm where I practice. For some, it is 
clear that they have specifically tailored their law school experience 
to overlap substantially with what might traditionally be considered 
business school subjects. Others seem entirely baffled by balance 
sheets and governance concepts, and this confuses me. Even if not 
working on corporate or transactional projects, most lawyers interact 
with business clients at least at some point in their career. Even non-
business-focused lawyers deal with these concepts personally at some 
point when in a firm or government setting. Having a working 
knowledge of these daily concerns seems like a no-brainer. I think 
law schools could do a better job exposing students to these concepts 
earlier on. 
It is not clear to me who can best “teach” this concept, but I 
think law students should be empowered to define their own career 
path. In this regard, I think law firms and other legal employers have 
a part to play. For example, my participation in getting the 
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Minnesota intrastate crowdfunding statute drafted was not due to 
some work assignment bestowed from on high. We had the 
enthusiasm, we defended the value proposition to my employer, and 
my firm was entirely supportive. To tie in with my earlier point, my 
experience with defending a business idea came in handy when 
advocating for a potentially negative-return time commitment. 
Crowdfunding issuers continue to contact the firm for assistance 
with their offerings, rewarding the bravery. 
Tim Joyce: I was fortunate (in my opinion) to come to law 
school after approximately a decade in the “real world.” Now, I am 
about to go back into the real world, one degree richer and several 
thousand dollars further in debt. This has caused me to think 
critically and objectively at many points about the value of a law 
degree in 2017. 
From an older student’s perspective, I think the most valuable 
thing law schools have begun to do is focus on practical and clinical 
experiential learning. In addition to knowledge of the law, this style 
of instruction (done properly—that is, graded holistically) most 
closely simulates the real-life experience of attorneys. For instance, 
my 1L class was given the opportunity to evaluate the merits of a 
hypothetical employment case and draft memos to both the client 
and the assigning partner. The assignment gave us the opportunity 
to practice some non-legal writing skills—formatting, tone, 
addressing a non-lawyer audience—that can have as much, if not 
more, impact on the outcome of a negotiation as the merits. In 
another class, we spent the semester negotiating the terms of a 
hypothetical LLC operating agreement while simultaneously 
learning the law of partnerships, LLCs, LLPs, and other business 
organizations. I can honestly say that concepts related to this 
assignment have come up literally dozens of times in my clerkship. 
Law schools need more classes like this one, and such classes should 
be more often included in graduation requirements. 
In a similar vein, and I openly admit the apparent dissonance 
between my statements and the publication medium, I think law 
schools spend too much time emphasizing the benefits of 
participation on law reviews and journals. That is not to say that I 
think journals are wholly without value—I wouldn’t manage the tech 
journal at my school if I thought that. I only think the historical 
prestige associated with being an editor or staffer is either no longer 
relevant or never was. Being an editor or staffer is fine for students 
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interested in becoming subject-matter experts (say, in investment 
crowdfunding) or impressing a judge with demonstrated attention 
to detail. For everyone else, see my earlier comments about the value 
of experiential learning opportunities. 
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